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NOTE
Fetal Protection Policies No Longer a Bona Fide Occupational Qualifica-
tion Defense? International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct.
1196 (1991)
I. INTRODUCTION
In today's society, factories use chemicals and other hazardous sub-
stances that may adversely affect employees' reproductive systems, as well
as the health of fetuses carried by pregnant employees.' In response to
these hazards and to potential tort liability, many employers have instituted
policies that exclude fertile women from jobs that expose them to such sub-
stances.2 Because these policies limit job opportunities, it is hotly debated
whether fetal protection policies are morally, ethically, and legally
justified.3
The United States Supreme Court, in International Union, UAW v.
Johnson Controls,4 recently decided the legal aspect of this debate. Johnson
Controls, a Milwaukee-based producer of automotive batteries, instituted a
fetal protection policy that excluded fertile women from jobs involving lead
exposure in excess of the Occupational Safety and Health Administration
(OSHA) standards.5 The Supreme Court held that Title VII of the 1964
Civil Rights Act6 forbids such sex-specific fetal protection policies because
they overtly discriminate and are not justified as a bona fide occupational
qualification.7
1. See Pendleton Elizabeth Hamlet, Note, Fetal Protection Policies: A Statutory Proposal in
the Wake of International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 75 CORNELL L. Rv. 1110,
1120-24 (1990).
2. See, e.g., Grant v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1303 (6th Cir. 1990); Hayes v. Shelby
Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.
1982); see also Mary E. Becker, Note, From Muller v. Oregon to Fetal Vulnerability Policies, 53 U.
CH. L. REv. 1219 (1986); Wendy W. Williams, Note, Firing the Woman to Protect the Fetus: The
Reconciliation of Fetal Protection with Employment Opportunity Goals under Title VII, 69 GEO.
L.J. 641, 641-43 (1981); Recent Case, 103 HARV. L. REv. 977, 980-83 (1990).
3. See, e.g., Becker, supra note 2, at 1219-21; Williams, supra note 2, at 643; Arlynn Leiber
Presser, Women At Work- Should "Fetal Protection" Policies Be Upheld? A.B.A. J., June 1990, at
38.
4. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
5. 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1991).
6. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1991).
7. Johnson Controls, Ill S. Ct. at 1209-10.
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This Note will discuss the impact of Johnson Controls on current Title
VII law. First, the facts of Johnson Controls will be presented.' Second, a
general background of the applicable law9 will be discussed. Third, Johnson
Controls' holding will be analyzed.' 0 This article will conclude that Johnson
Controls correctly follows established Title VII law and allows for a com-
promise among the competing concerns of employers, society, and
employees. "
II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Johnson Controls is a major manufacturer of automotive batteries.
Lead, a substance with known health risks to anyone exposed to it,'2 is a
primary ingredient in the manufacturing process. From 1977 to 1982,
Johnson Controls allowed women to work in the various jobs, but strongly
warned female employees that if they expected to have a child, they should
not choose a job which would expose them to lead."' Between 1979 and
1983, eight employees became pregnant while maintaining lead levels in
their blood in excess of thirty micrograms per deciliter, the critical level set
by the Occupational Safety and Health Act.14 In response, and in fear of
potential tort liability, the company instituted a new policy in 1982. Wo-
men were excluded from jobs exposing them to lead levels in excess of
OSHA standards unless they could medically document their infertility.' 5
In April 1984, the International Union, United Auto Workers (UAW)
filed a class action in United States District Court for the Eastern District
of Wisconsin.' 6 The plaintiffs challenged Johnson Controls' fetal protection
policy as being discriminatory under Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights
8. See infra notes 12-22 and accompanying text.
9. See infra note 23-61 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 62-99 and accompanying text.
11. See infra notes 100-120 and accompanying text.
12. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1199 (1991); see also
Hamlet, supra note 1, at 1120-24; Williams, supra note 2, at 655-60.
13. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1199. Prior to June 1977, Johnson Controls did not em-
ploy any females in battery-manufacturing jobs. Id.
14. Id. at 1199-1200; see 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1025 (1991).
15. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1200. They were also excluded from promotions to jobs
which could expose them to lead. Id.
16. The class was certified as "consisting of 'all past, present and future production and main-
tenance employees' in United Auto Workers bargaining units at nine of Johnson Controls' plants
who have been and continue to be affected by [the employers] Fetal Protection Policy." Id. Indi-
vidual plaintiffs included Mary Craig, who chose to be sterilized to avoid losing her job; Elsie
Nason, who suffered a pay cut when she was transferred out of a lead-exposed job; and Donald




Act. 7 The district court analyzed the policy under a three part business
necessity defense: whether there is a substantial health risk to the fetus,
whether transmission of the hazard to the fetus occurs only through wo-
men, and whether there is a less discriminatory alternative equally capable
of preventing the hazard to the fetus.18 The court granted summary judg-
ment in favor of Johnson Controls because it found that there was a sub-
stantial hazard to the fetus, that the fetus was more vulnerable to lead
exposure than adults, and that petitioners failed to establish an acceptable
alternative capable of protecting the fetus.19
The Seventh Circuit affirmed summary judgment by a 7-4 vote.2" Like
the lower court, the majority held that the business necessity defense was
the proper standard for evaluating the fetal protection policy and upheld
the policy because there was a substantial risk of lead exposure to a fetus,
the evidence of risk through the father's exposure, unlike the mother's, was
"at best speculative," and petitioners did not present evidence of a less dis-
criminatory alternative.21 The court also ruled that Johnson Controls met
the bona fide occupational qualification defense (BFOQ) because industrial
safety is a part of the essence of its business and the policy is reasonably
necessary to further this concern.22 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and ruled that the fetal protection policy is facially discriminatory and not
justified as a BFOQ.23
III. BACKGROUND OF THE LAW
A. Early History of Title VII
Historically, employers legally limited women's employment opportuni-
ties out of a professed "concern for the health of women and their off-
spring."24 Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act later declared such
17. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-2 (1991).
18. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 680 F. Supp. 309, 313 (E.D. Wis. 1988),
aff'd, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
19. Id. at 315-16. Because the policy met the business necessity defense, a bona fide occupa-
tional qualification analysis was not necessary. Id. at 316 n.5.
20. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871 (7th Cir. 1989), rev'd, 111
S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
21. Id. at 888-93.
22. Id. at 898. The Seventh Circuit became the first court of appeals to hold a fetal protection
to be justified as a BFOQ.
23. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1196.
24. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hospital, 726 F.2d 1543, 1545 (11th Cir. 1984) (citing Muller
v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412 (1908)); see Note, Developments in the Law Employment Discrimination
and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1166-95 (1971). Women
were considered less able to protect themselves and suffered from such stereotypical views as
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practices to be unlawful sex discrimination,2 5 yet employers continued to
limit employment opportunities on the basis of pregnancy. Although the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission stated that such a practice
constitutes sex discrimination,26 the Supreme Court, in General Electric Co.
v. Gilbert,27 held that pregnancy-based discrimination is not sex discrimina-
tion under Title VII.
28
Congress quickly responded to the Gilbert decision by passing the Preg-
nancy Discrimination Act (PDA).29 Title VII now states:
The terms "because of sex" or "on the basis of sex" include ...
because of or on the basis of pregnancy, childbirth, or related medi-
cal conditions; and women affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or re-
lated medical conditions shall be treated the same for all
employment-related purposes... as other persons not so affected
but similar in their ability or inability to work .... 30
The PDA overruled not only Gilbert's holding that different treatment
based on pregnancy is not a violation of Title VII, but also its test of sex
having less need for money, a high rate of absenteeism, and being emotionally weak and incapable
of doing the work. Id. at 1167-68.
25. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-2 (1991). This act states that it is unlawful for an employer
to
fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise discriminate against any
individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employ-
ment, because of such individual's ... sex ... or ... limit, segregate, or classify his
employment or applications for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to
deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status
as an employee, because of such individual's... sex.
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2.
26. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission Guideline, 29 C.F.R. § 1604.10(b) (1975).
This states in pertinent part:
Disabilities caused or contributed to by pregnancy, miscarriage, abortion, childbirth, and
recovery therefrom are, for all job-related purposes, temporary disabilities and should be
treated as such under any health or temporary disability insurance or sick leave plan avail-
able in connection with employment .... [Benefits] shall be applied to disability due to
pregnancy or childbirth on the same terms and conditions as they are applied to other
temporary disabilities.
Id.
27. 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
28. The Court based its rationale on the premise that the employer's disability plan distin-
guished between pregnant women on the one hand and nonpregnant women and men on the
other. Pregnancy-related disabilities are just an additional risk, unique to women. Gilbert, 429
U.S. at 139. Such a "neutral" distinction, however, can be discriminatory if the pregnancy con-
cerns are a mere pretext to deny women of employment opportunities or have the effect of denying
women such opportunities. Id.
29. Pub. L. No. 95-555, 92 Stat. 2076 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(k) (1991)).
30. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1991).
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discrimination.3" Sex discrimination occurs where employees of one sex are
treated in a manner which but for their sex would be different.32
B. Approaches to Title VII
The courts have developed two theories by which an employee may es-
tablish a Title VII violation-disparate treatment and disparate impact.
Disparate treatment occurs where the employer treats some people less fa-
vorably because of race, religion, sex, color, or national origin. Proof of a
discriminatory motive is critical, although such a motive may be inferred
from the circumstances. Disparate impact cases involve a facially neutral
employer practice that falls more harshly on one group of people than an-
other. Unlike disparate treatment cases, proof of discriminatory motive is
not necessary.33 Although both theories are forms of Title VII discrimina-
tion, each is established differently and presents different defenses for the
employer.34
In disparate treatment cases, the employee must establish by a prepon-
derance of the evidence a facially discriminatory employment practice. The
employee may make such a prima facie case by showing that she applied for
an available job position for which she was qualified, but was rejected under
circumstances giving rise to an inference of discrimination. 35 The employer
must then rebut the presumption of discrimination by producing evidence
of a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection. 36
The employer need not persuade the trier of fact that the defendant was
actually motivated by the stated reasons. If a clear and reasonably specific
31. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v. EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 676 (1983).
32. Id at 683 (citing Los Angeles Dept. of Water & Power v. Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711
(1978)). Using this test, Newport News struck down as discriminatory an employer's insurance
plan that provided less extensive pregnancy benefits for the spouses of male employees than it
provided for female employees. Id at 676.
33. International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 336 n.15 (1977).
34. See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 725 F.2d 1543, 1547 (1908).
35. Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981); see also McDon-
nell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). The McDonnell Douglas Court stated that
a prima facie case may be established through a four part showing: (1) the plaintiff belongs to a
class protected by Title VII; (2) the plaintiff applied for a job for which the defendant was seeking
applicants; (3) despite the plaintiff's qualifications, the plaintiff was not hired; and (4) the position
remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of plaintiff's qualifica-
tion. Id at 802. However, the Court recognized that the exact facts of this four part showing may
vary with the circumstances. Id at 802 n.13.
36. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 254; McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802. Obviously the employer
cannot meet this burden merely through an answer in the complaint or by argument of counsel.
The evidence must be legally sufficient to justify a judgment for the defendant. Burdine, 450 U.S.
at 255. The employee retains the burden of persuading the trier of fact that the employer inten-
tionally discriminated against the employee. Id at 253.
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reason is given, the policy is justified unless the employee shows that the
proffered reason is merely a pretext for discrimination.3 7 The employee
may do this "by persuading the court that a discriminatory reason more
likely motivated the employer or... that the employer's proffered explana-
tion is unworthy of credence."
38
Once a case of sex discrimination is made, the employer's only recourse
is the statutory BFOQ affirmative defense. Under this defense, the em-
ployer's practice is unlawful except where the employer shows sex to be "a
bona fide occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal oc-
cupation of that particular business."39 This defense is extremely narrow'
in that job qualification must be such that the essence of the business would
be undermined without it. Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell4l established
a two prong approach to the BFOQ defense. First, the job qualification
must not be "so peripheral to the central mission of the employer's busi-
ness"42 that it is not reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the
business. Second, to meet the "reasonably necessary" standard, the em-
ployer must show "a factual basis for believing, that all or substantially all
[females] would be unable to perform safely and efficiently the duties of the
job,"43 or that it is impossible or highly impractical to deal with female
employees on an individualized basis.4
37. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 256.
38. Id ; see also McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05. The McDonnell Douglas Court indi-
cated that evidence of a pretext included considerations of how others with the plaintiff's qualifi-
cations were treated, of the employer's prior treatment of the plaintiff during employment, and of
the employer's general policy and practice with respect to minority (or other) employment. Mc-
Donnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 804-05.
39. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1991).
40. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1197, 1205 (1991); Dothard
v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 333 (1977). The Dothard Court found that the BFOQ defense was
met because the height and weight requirements for correctional counselors in high security pris-
ons were necessary to counteract the environment of violence and disorganization in the peniten-
tiaries, where essence of the job is to maintain security. Dothard, 433 U.S. at 334-35.
41. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
42. Id. at 413. In some cases, safety concerns of third parties may go to the essence, or
central mission, of the business, such as business customers who are indispensable to the business.
See Dothard, 433 U.S. 321 (holding safety is part of the essence of a correctional counselor's job in
a high security prison); Western Airlines v. Criswell, 472 U.S. 400 (1985) (using the Age Discrimi-
nation Employment Act's parallel to Title VII's BFOQ-safety was held to be part of the essence
of an airline's business). Where safety does go to the essence of the business, "[t]he greater safety
factor, measured by the likelihood of harm and the probable severity of that harm in case of an
accident, the more stringent may be the job qualifications designed to ensure [safety]." Criswell,
472 U.S. at 413 (quoting Usery v. Tamiami Trial Tours, Inc., 531 F.2d 224, 236 (5th Cir. 1976)).
43. Criswell, 472 U.S. at 414.
44. Id.
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Griggs v. Duke Power Co. 45 and its progeny set forth the disparate im-
pact situation. This line of cases holds that Title VII covers "not only overt
discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in
operation."'4" To establish a case of disparate impact, the employee must
establish that the employer's policy has a discriminatory effect despite being
neutral on its face, and even neutral in terms of the employer's intent. 7
Such a policy is prohibited unless the employer justifies it as a business
necessity.
48
Unlike the BFOQ, the business necessity defense was created by case
law. When Griggs expanded Title VII to prohibit discrimination resulting
from disparate impact, the Supreme Court created the business necessity
defense to dispel the inference of discrimination that arises because of a
policy's discriminatory impact. 9 In fact, business necessity is not really a
defense to discrimination. Instead, it assists in the determination of
whether the policy is discriminatory in the first instance.5 When asserting
this defense, the employer has the burden of production, but not persua-
sion,"1 to show that "any given requirement [has] a manifest relationship to
45. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). The Griggs Court struck down policies that indirectly continued the
employer's formerly overt discriminatory practices by requiring employees to pass aptitude tests
and to have a high school education. Such neutral policies "cannot be maintained if they operate
to 'freeze' the status quo of prior discriminatory practices." Id. at 430. The Court went on to
state that although Title VII
does not command that any person be hired simply because he was formerly the subject of
discrimination, or because he is a member of a minority group... [w]hat is required by
Congress is the removal of artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment
when the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of racial or other imper-
missible classification.
Id. at 430-31.
46. Id at 431.
47. Id at 430; see Albermarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975). The Moody
Court struck down a policy similar to the one in Griggs because it was not shown "to be predictive
of or significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which comprise or are
relevant to the job or jobs for which candidates are being evaluated." Moody, 422 U.S. at 431
(citing EEOC Guideline, 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c) (1975)).
48. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431. Unlike the BFOQ, there is "no requirement that the challenged
practice be 'essential' or 'indispensable' to the employers business for it to pass muster" under the
business necessity defense. Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642, 659 (1989).
49. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431.
50. See Stephen F. Befort, Note, BFOQ Revisited: Johnson Controls Halts the Expansion of
the Defense to Intentional Sex Discrimination, 52 OHio ST. L.J. 5, 10 (1991).
51. Wards Cove, 490 U.S. at 659. This holding reversed prior Supreme Court decisions that
placed this burden on the employer, and now makes it harder for the employee to establish a case
of discrimination. See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 424; Moody, 422 U.S. at 405. However, the Civil Rights
Act of 1991 overturns the Wards Cove holding by again placing both the burden of production
and persuasion on the employer. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e(m), 2000e-(k)(2)(A)(i) (1991).
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the employment in question."52 The necessity must relate to the safe and
efficient operation of the business.53 If the employer meets its burden and
the employee fails to persuade the fact finder that the defense does not ap-
ply, the policy will be upheld unless the employee shows that "other [poli-
cies], without a similarly undesirable [discriminatory] effect, would also
serve the employer's legitimate interest in 'efficient and trustworthy
workmanship.'
C. Fetal Protection Issues
In light of this background, the issue now is how to deal with fetal pro-
tection policies instituted in the work place. This issue involves the interre-
lation of Title VII's regulation of employment discrimination and the
Occupational Safety and Health Act's 5 regulation of work place safety.
Many employment situations expose workers to toxic substances which
"could cause harm to... reproductive systems [of both men and women]
and prove deadly to a fetus."56 Although the exact effect of many sub-
stances is largely unknown,57 it is known that lead is extremely dangerous
to human health, even in moderate doses. 8 Furthermore, every jurisdic-
tion now permits suits by children who were injured as fetuses by third
52. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432.
53. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 332 n.14 (1977). "Congress has commanded...
that any tests used must measure the person for the job and not the person in the abstract."
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436. Although not adopted by the Supreme Court, an alternative test expands
the business necessity defense beyond mere job relatedness by showing that (I) the purpose must
be sufficiently compelling to override any discriminatory impact, (2) the policy must effectively
carry out the business purpose it is alleged to serve, and (3) there must be no acceptable alterna-
tive policies or practices which would better accomplish the business purpose advanced. Robinson
v. Lorrillard, 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
54. Moody, 422 U.S. at 425.
55. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1991).
56. Hamlet, supra note 1, at 1121.
57. As one scholar noted, "[t]he lack of scientific evidence regarding the effect of chemicals
on the reproductive systems of both male and female workers complicates the problem of articu-
lating an adequate fetal protection policy." Id. at 1122.
58. Id. at 1121-22. The author goes on to state:
[T]oleration levels for lead exposure are much lower for young children and developing
fetuses than for adult men and women. Lead attacks the human nervous system, posing
serious hazards to a developing brain. Lead-exposed fetuses are threatened with stillbirth,
low birth weight, and 'retarded cognitive development which may result in learning and
behavioral disorders.' The fact that the human body stores lead in soft tissues and bone
further complicates the problem of lead exposure; high levels of lead may remain in a
worker's bloodstream for a long period of time after removal of the worker from a toxic
area. This makes it difficult for women to plan pregnancies while working, and it poses a
real threat to fetuses in unexpected or accidental pregnancies.
Id. at 1124 (citations omitted).
[Vol. 75:489
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parties. 9 As a result, employers may face potential tort liability for any
injuries that these children may receive as a result of their parents' exposure
to toxic substances in the work place.6"
Motivated by concern for the effect of such substances on fetuses and for
potential tort liability,61 "employers opt to close doors to women workers
rather than face potential liability for future injuries' 62 and thus institute
fetal protection policies. These policies generally exclude only women from
jobs exposing them to such substances despite studies that indicate that men
and their offspring are also at risk. Furthermore, women are "excluded
more often from the traditionally male-intensive jobs than female-intensive
jobs, even when exposures [to hazardous substances] are similar."63 Many
courts must now decide what approach to use in evaluating sex-specific fetal
protection policies under Title VII. Courts which have decided this issue
have reached different results: some adopted the disparate impact ap-
proach,61 others adopted the overt discrimination approach,65 and still
others formulated their own approach.66
59. Id at 1127.
60. lId at 1126-27. Most authors believe that parental waiver would not bar such suits,
though there are arguments to the contrary. See International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls,
111 S. Ct. 1196, 1211 (1991); 3 FOWLER HARPER, ET AL., LAW OF TORTS 677-78 n.15 (2d ed.
1986); W. PAGE KEETON, ET AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTs § 55, at 368
(5th ed. 1984).
61. It is noteworthy that despite these fears, awards regarding prenatal injuries from maternal
exposure to toxins at the work place are almost nonexistent, and that many scholars feel that there
is almost no basis for holding an employer liable for fetal harm if the employer fully informs the
employee of the risks and has not acted in a negligent manner. Hamlet, supra note 1, at 1125-26.
62. Id at 1124.
63. Williams, supra note 2, at 649 (footnote omitted). For example, female workers are not
excluded from certain health care jobs and clerical jobs where they sit in front of video display
terminals, which also present reproductive health hazards. Hamlet, supra note 1, at 1125; BNA
SPECIAL REPORT, PREGNANCY AND EMPLOYMENT: THE COMPLETE HANDBOOK ON DISCRIMI-
NATION, MATERNITY LEAVE, HEALTH AND SAFETY 58 (1987); Becker, supra note 2, at 1219;
Williams, supra note 2, at 649 n.58. It has been noted that "[a]s a general pattern, employers will
not employ women in toxic areas unless their need for a female labor source outweighs their fear
of tort liability." Hamlet, supra note 1, at 1125.
64. Zuniga v. Kleberg County Hosp., 692 F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1982) (decided under pre-PDA
law, the court found that pregnant x-ray technicians who were denied a leave of absence and not
guaranteed a job on return faced a substantial burden male x-ray technicians did not face); Wright
v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982) (decided under post-PDA law, but ignored the
PDA's mandate that pregnancy discrimination is overt gender discrimination, noting that the
BFOQ defense was too hard for employers to meet).
65. Grant v. General Motors Corp., 908 F.2d 1303 (6th Cir. 1990) (decided shortly after the
Supreme Court granted certiorari in Johnson Controls, it became the first appellate court to note in
the fetal protection area that the PDA transformed distinctions based on pregnancy into overt
sexual discrimination so that the only defense is the BFOQ).
66. Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1543-44 (11th Cir. 1984) (interpreted
the PDA as making distinctions based on pregnancy presumptively discriminatory, which can be
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IV. EVALUATION OF JOHNSON CONTROLS
A. The Majority Opinion
In International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls,6 7 the Supreme Court
held that sex-specific fetal protection policies are explicitly discriminatory
and can only be justified as a BFOQ.68 By excluding fertile women from
jobs which would expose them to lead while "[f]ertile men.., are given a
choice as to whether they wish to risk their reproductive health for a partic-
ular job,"6 9 Johnson Controls created a classification based on gender, thus
70discriminating against women. Moreover, by using "capable of bearing
children" as the criterion for exclusion and by treating all female employees
as potentially pregnant, Johnson Controls' policy discriminated on the basis
of pregnancy, which the Pregnancy Discrimination Act (PDA)71 states is
gender-based discrimination.72 Johnson Controls' benevolent intent did not
make this explicitly discriminatory policy neutral.73 In sum, the policy
treated "a person in a manner which but for that person's sex would be
different."'74
Narrowly construing the BFOQ defense, the majority ruled that the
BFOQ defense prohibits an employer from discriminating against a woman
because of her capacity to become pregnant unless it prevents her from do-
rebutted if "the employer shows (1) that a substantial risk of harm exists and (2) that the risk is
borne only by members of one sex; and (3) the employee fails to show that there are acceptable
alternative policies that would have a lesser impact on the affected sex."). Id. at 1554.
67. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
68. d at 1204 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's Policy Guidance, Ap-
pendix to Petition for Certiorari 127a at 133a-134a, International Union, UAW v. Johnson Con-
trols, 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991)).
69. Id. at 1202. The respondent assumed as much in its brief, yet the Seventh Circuit, like
other circuits, still assumed that such policies do not involve facial discrimination and proceeded
to analyze them under the business necessity defense. Id at 1203; see also Hayes v. Shelby Memo-
rial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543, 1547 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin Corp., 697 F.2d 1172, 1190 (4th
Cir. 1982).
70. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1203. Johnson Controls is "concerned only with the
harms that may befall the unborn offspring of its female employees," as evidenced by its require-
ment that only female employees must produce proof of their infertility. Id at 1203.
71. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1991).
72. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1203; see Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co. v.
EEOC, 462 U.S. 669, 684 (1983). This is true despite evidence about the risks of lead exposure on
the male reproductive system. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1202-03.
73. As the Court noted, "disparate treatment through explicit facial discrimination does not
depend on why the employer discriminates but rather on the explicit terms of the discrimination."
Id. at 1204; see Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971) (motives underlying the
employer's express exclusion of women did not alter the policy's intentionally discriminatory
character).
74. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1204 (quoting Los Angeles Dep't. of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 711 (1978)).
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ing the job.75 The language of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act76 and the
PDA,77 as well as their legislative histories78 and case law,79 support this
interpretation by indicating that the occupational qualification must be ob-
jective and must concern job-related skills and aptitudes so that the qualifi-
cation falls within the essence of the business. Safety concerns constitute a
BFOQ only where "sex or pregnancy actually interferes with the woman's
ability to perform the job."80 Concerns about the safety of third parties
properly justify a policy only where those third parties are so indispensable
to the particular business that the employee's job performance and the cen-
tral purpose of the business are implicated.81 Unconceived fetuses are
"neither customers nor third parties whose safety is essential to the business
of battery manufacturing."82
Under this interpretation, Johnson Controls' policy was not a BFOQ.
Fertile women were able to perform the job in question as safely and effi-
ciently as anyone else, and there was no factual basis for believing other-
75. I at 1204-07.
76. The BFOQ defense reaches only "those certain instances where.., sex... is a bona fide
occupational qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of that particular busi-
ness." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e)(1) (1991).
77. "[W]omen affected by pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions shall be
treated the same for all employment-related purposes... as other persons not so affected but
similar in their ability or inability to work.... ." 42 U.S.C. § 2000 e(k) (1991).
78. AMENDING TITLE VII, CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964, S. REP. No. 331, 95th Cong., 1st
Sess. 4-6 (1977) states:
Under this bill, the treatment of pregnant women in covered employment must focus not
on their condition alone but on the actual effects of that condition on their ability to work.
Pregnant women who are able to work must be permitted to work on the same conditions
as other employees....
.... [E]mployers will no longer be permitted to force women who become pregnant to stop
working regardless of their ability to ontinue ....
See also PROHIBITION OF SEX DISCRIMINATION BASED ON PREGNANCY, H.R. REP. No. 948,
95th Cong., 2d Sess. 3-6, reprinted in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4749. Congress thus made clear that the
decision to become pregnant or work while pregnant or fertile is reserved for each woman to make
for herself.
79. See, eg., Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977); Western Air Lines, Inc. v. Criswell,
472 U.S. 400 (1985).
80. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1206.
81. Id; see, eg., Dothard, 433 U.S. at 321 (high security prison counselors); Criswell, 472
U.S. at 400 (flight engineers); Burwell v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 633 F.2d 361 (4th Cir. 1980) cert.
denied, 450 U.S. 965 (1981) (flight attendants); Gardner v. National Airlines, Inc., 434 F. Supp.
249 (S.D. Fla. 1977), aff'd, 965 F.2d 1457 (11th Cir. 1990) Thus, the court reiterates that "an
employer must direct its concerns about a women's ability to perform her job safely and efficiently
to those aspects of the woman's job related activities that fall within the 'essence' of the particular
business." Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1207.
82. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1206. Though no one can disregard the possibility of
injury to future children, the BFOQ is not so broad as to transform this social concern into an
essential aspect of battery making. Id
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wise. Concern about the welfare of the next generation does not establish a
BFOQ defense.83 Title VII and the PDA mandate that "[d]ecisions about
the welfare of future children be left to the parents who conceive, bear,
support, and raise them rather than to the employers who hire those par-
ents .... Title VII and the PDA simply do not allow a woman's dismissal
because of her failure to submit to sterilization."84 Such concerns, the ma-
jority stated, do not go to the "essence" of Johnson Controls' business. 85
While potential fetal injury "is a social cost that Title VII does not re-
quire a company to ignore,"86 the majority felt that this concern did not
conflict with Title VII's ban of sex-specific fetal protection policies.87
OSHA considered this problem but concluded "there is no basis whatsoever
for the claim that women of child bearing age should be excluded from the
workplace in order to protect the fetus."'88 Furthermore, Title VII forbids
illegal sex discrimination as a way to divert attention from an employer's
obligation to police the workplace.89 Given that Title VII bans sex-specific
fetal protection policies, the majority believed that as long as "the employer
fully informs the woman of the risk, and the employer has not acted negli-
gently, the basis for holding an employer liable seems remote at best."90
83. Johnson Controls' fear of prenatal injury, no matter how sincere, did not begin to show
that a substantial number of pregnant women were incapable of doing their job. In addition, the
record does not indicate that there are many Johnson Controls workers who do in fact become
pregnant. National statistics indicate that approximately nine percent of fertile women become
pregnant each year and this drops to two percent for blue collar workers over thirty. Id; see
Becker, supra note 2 at 1233. Furthermore, of the eight reported pregnancies, it hasn't been
shown that any of the babies have birth defects or abnormalities. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at
1208.
84. Id. at 1207.
85. Id. It is mere word play to say that Johnson Controls' job is to make batteries without
risk to fetuses in the same way Western Air Lines' job is to fly planes without crashing. Id
(quoting International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d 871, 913 (1988) (Easterbrook,
J., dissenting).
86. The cost includes not only the injury, but also tort liability since almost all states recog-
nize a right to recover for a prenatal injury based on negligence or wrongful death. Id at 1208
(citing Johnson Controls, 886 F.2d at 904-05).
87. Id at 1208.
88. Id. at 1209.
89. Id. (citing 43 Fed. Reg. 52952, 52966 (1978)).
90. Id. at 1208. To the extent state tort law furthers discrimination in the work place and
prevents employers from hiring women who are capable of doing the job as efficiently as men, it
will impede the goals behind Title VII. Such state laws are thus preempted by Title VII, since
they punish employers for complying with Title VII. Id. at 1209; see, e.g., Florida Line & Avo-
cado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132 (1963); Farmers Educ. & Coop. Union v. WDAY, Inc.,
360 U.S. 525 (1959).
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Any incremental cost of employing members of one sex is irrelevant to the
BFOQ defense.91
B. The White, Rehnquist, and Kennedy Concurrence
In their concurrence, Justice White, Chief Justice Rehnquist, and Jus-
tice Kennedy believed that the BFOQ defense was broad enough to include
considerations of cost, safety, and potential tort liability and could justify
sex-specific policies.92 Both Dothard v. Rawlinson93 and Western Airlines v.
Criswell94 make it clear that
avoidance of substantial safety risks to third parties is inherently part
of both an employee's ability to perform a job and an employer's
normal operation of its business... [and] that costs are relevant in
determining whether a discriminatory policy is reasonably necessary
for the normal operation of a business.95
Common sense dictates that it is "part of the normal operation of business
... to avoid causing [harm] to [others] as well as... to avoid tort liability
and its substantial costs." 96 Furthermore, the PDA does not restrict this
91. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1209 (citing Los Angeles Dep't of Water & Power v.
Manhart, 435 U.S. 702, 716-18 n.32 (1978)). Congress considered the cost of providing equal
treatment of pregnancy and related conditions "but made the 'decision to forbid special treatment
of pregnancy despite the social costs associated therewith."' Id (quoting Arizona Governing
Committee v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1084 n.14 (1983)). The Court "did not decide a case in which
costs would be so prohibitive as to threaten the survival of the employer's business." Id.
92. Id at 1210-11 (White, J., concurring). Nothing in the wording of the statutory BFOQ
defense indicates that it could never justify sex-specific fetal protection policies. Id. Furthermore,
contrary to what the majority suggests, tort liability for fetal injuries is a very real possibility.
First, it is not clear that Title VII preempts state tort law. Id Second, although warnings may
preclude employee's claims, they do not preclude their children's claims because parents cannot
waive causes of actions on behalf of the children. Id Finally, it will be difficult for employers to
determine in advance what constitutes negligence. Id Mere compliance with OSHA is not a
defense to tort liability. Id (citing National Solid Wastes Management Ass'n. v. Killian, 918 F.2d
671, 680 (7th Cir. 1990)). Moreover, strict liability is a possibility if the manufacturing process is
abnormally dangerous. Id
93. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
94. 472 U.S. 400 (1985).
95. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1213 (White, J., concurring) (emphasis in original);
Dothard, 433 U.S. 321 (Safety concerns of female prison guards justified sex as BFOQ). In Cris-
well, the Court held that "[wlhen an employer establishes that a job qualification has been care-
fully formulated to respond to documented concerns for public safety, it will not be overly
burdensome to persuade a trier of fact that the qualification is 'reasonably necessary' to safe opera-
tion of the business." Criswell, 472 U.S. at 419.
96. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1210 (White, J., concurring). The majority's reliance on
Manhart for the proposition that extra costs is not a defense is misplaced because that decision did
not hold that costs were irrelevant to a BFOQ. It at 1211.
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BFOQ test. It merely clarifies "that pregnancy and related conditions are
included within Title VII's anti-discrimination provisions."97
The concurrence agreed, however, that summary judgment was im-
proper because there was a dispute over material facts.9" First, the lower
court failed to consider whether the policy insisted on a risk avoidance level
higher than that normally tolerated in the operation of Johnson Controls'
business.99 Second, the policy reached too far with its presumption of fertil-
ity and "exclusion of presumptively fertile women from positions that
might result in a promotion to a position involving high lead exposure
levels. ' ' l °" Third, Johnson Controls did not identify any grounds for believ-
ing its current policy to be reasonably necessary to its normal operations. 101
Neither did it show that the risk of harm or costs substantially increased
since the institution of its old policy.1"2 Finally, the lower court failed to
consider the evidence of harm to the offspring caused by lead exposure in
males. 103
C. Justice Scalia's Concurrence
Justice Scalia, although generally agreeing with the majority, expressed
some reservations. First, he believed that evidence about the debilitating
effect of lead exposure on the male reproductive system was irrelevant. The
policy would still be discriminatory without such evidence because it treats
women differently than men on the basis of pregnancy. °4 The fact that
Johnson Controls showed no factual basis for believing that all or substan-
tially all women would be unable to perform their job safely was also irrele-
vant because "Title VII gives parents the power to make occupational
decisions affecting their families."10  Furthermore, he indicated that
preemptions only result when compliance with Title VII violates state law.
However, because he believed Title VII accommodates state tort law
97. Id. at 1213 (White, J., concurring); see AMENDING TITLE VII, supra note 78, at 4 ("Ilt
did not change the application of Title VII... in any other way" other than including pregnancy
within its terms); PROHIBITION OF SEX DISCRIMINATION, supra note 78, at 4 ("Pregnancy-based
distinctions are subject to the same scrutiny on the same terms as other acts of sex
discrimination").
98. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1215-16 (White, J., concurring).





104. Id. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring) (citing Pregnancy Discrimination Act of 1978, 42
U.S.C. § 2000e(k) (1991)).
105. Id. (Scalia, J., concurring) (quoting International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 886
F.2d 871, 915 (1988) (Easterbrook, J., dissenting)).
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through the BFOQ exception, Justice Scalia was still willing to assume that
action required by Title VII could not give rise to liability under state tort
law. In any event, Johnson Controls "has not demonstrated a substantial
risk of tort liability-which is alone enough to defeat a tort-based assertion
of BFOQ exception." 106 Finally, nothing in prior case law suggested that
increased costs could not support a BFOQ defense. However, Johnson
Controls did not assert a cost-based BFOQ. For these reasons, Justice
Scalia believed that summary judgment was improper.
V. ANALYSIS
International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls'10 7 majority properly fol-
lows Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act'08 law by applying the BFOQ
defense. Lower courts fashioned a result-oriented approach based on the
business necessity defense and ignored the basic fact that sex-specific fetal
protection programs constitute overt gender discrimination. 109 Not only
did Johnson Controls discriminate on the basis of sex by excluding only
fertile women, but it also discriminated on the basis of pregnancy by ex-
cluding only those capable of bearing children."1 The BFOQ is the only
defense in such cases, 1 ' and it only applies to those cases where sex or
pregnancy adversely affect the person's ability to do the job." 2 Cost consid-
erations and the health of fetuses are simply unrelated to the person's ability
to do the job.
Extending the BFOQ to allow, in all cases, for concerns of third party
safety would confuse the narrow BFOQ with the broader business necessity
defense." 3 It would also contravene the Pregnancy Discrimination Act's
(PDA) mandate that pregnant women be treated the same as those with
similar abilities, as well as inadequately protect women from employers'
decisions, who generally apply such policies only to women and only when
they are perceived as marginal workers. Furthermore, the use of the busi-
ness necessity defense, which places on the plaintiff the burden of persuad-
ing the lack of a defense, with sex-specific policies would also be improper.
106. Id (Scalia, J., concurring).
107. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
108. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1991).
109. See Hayes v. Shelby Memorial Hosp., 726 F.2d 1543 (11th Cir. 1984); Wright v. Olin
Corp., 697 F.2d 1172 (4th Cir. 1982); Becker, supra note 2; Williams, supra note 2. This was not
unusual for federal courts, as they commonly confused business necessity with BFOQ.
110. Williams, supra note 2, at 677-78; see supra notes 62-69 and accompanying text.
111. Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1991).
112. See supra notes 70-78 and accompanying text.
113. Business necessity is defined in terms of safety and efficiency. See Recent Case, supra
note 2, at 981.
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This defense was made only for neutral policies having a discriminatory
effect" 4 and to use it here would undermine the protection of Title VII and
the PDA.I This is not to say that the business necessity defense is never
appropriate or that fetal protection policies are forever banned. Johnson
Controls only mandates that the policies not be discriminatory. If the poli-
cies are facially neutral, they may be defended as a business necessity,
which allows for consideration of cost and safety' 6 and which justifies poli-
cies where there is clear evidence of fetal harm through maternal exposure
and no evidence of other causes of harm.17
Johnson Controls is also correct in not making fetal protection policies
an exception to the traditional Title VII mandates. Title VII was designed
to regulate employment discrimination, not work place safety. Regulation
of work place safety is the function of the Occupational Safety and Health
Act (OSHA).' 8 Fetal protection requires a balancing of these two statutes
and their goals.1' 9 A compromise must be made between employers' and
society's concern for fetal safety, costs, and tort liability. None of these
concerns have been so "compelling that society has seen fit to provide abso-
lute protection for them."' 2 While "parents do have a right to make un-
hindered routine decisions concerning the child's physical welfare,"' 21
limits have been placed where society has an overriding compelling interest
in the child's safety.' 22 On the other hand, employers should not be given
free reign in making fetal protection policies. Absent an incentive to con-
sider the concerns of female employees, employers tend to consider only
their own concerns and will institute the most cost-effective policy despite
the adverse effect it may have on women. By allowing only nondiscrimina-
tory fetal protection policies, Johnson Controls continues Title VII's prohi-
bition of sex discrimination, yet allows for the regulation of work place
safety.
114. See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
115. See Hamlet, supra note 1, at 1141-42.
116. Alternatively, neutral policies can still be challenged as a pretext for discrimination. See
supra notes 42-50 and accompanying text.
117. Williams, supra note 2, at 652.
118. 29 U.S.C. § 651 (1991).
119. One scholar has suggested that should OSHA standards necessitate sex-specific fetal
protection policies, then the mandates of Title VII should give way unless a less discriminatory
alternative is feasible. However, Title VII's goals should prevail when a safety policy exceeds or
conflicts with OSHA standards. Befort, supra note 50, at 45.





Sex-specific fetal protection policies should be used with caution. They
have the same troubling aspects as the sex-specific protectionist legislation
of the pre-Title VII era. First, exclusionary policies relegate women to
lower paying, traditionally female jobs with fewer health benefits. Such
lower paying jobs also involve exposure to hazardous substances, yet typi-
cally are not covered by fetal protection policies because female workers are
needed. Given these facts, such policies may hurt more than aid fetal
safety. Second, such policies treat women only as child bearers and fail to
consider that women have an interest in earning a living and being a pro-
ductive part of society. Third, such policies, by applying only to women,
are also too narrow because they ignore evidence that the same substances
equally affect the male's reproductive system and his children. 23 Fourth,
fetal protection policies are not instituted uniformly. The policies tend to
exist only in those jobs where women are considered marginal workers. Fi-
nally, such policies ignore the fact that women are competent decision mak-
ers, are concerned for their children's health, and, once informed of the
risks and advantages, are in a better position than their employers to make
decisions as to fetal safety. 24
Should there ever be a need for sex-specific fetal protection policies,
Congress, not the employers or the courts, should institute them. Employ-
ers have no incentive to balance competing interests. Courts tend to be
biased against women's claims of discrimination, with some even dismissing
such claims with overt hostility to the female claimants. 25 Congress, on
the other hand, will be lobbied from both sides and will more likely come to
a balanced compromise. Whatever Congress does, though, it should keep
in mind the presumption that both men and women have the right to make
informed decisions as to the environment they will work.1 26 Furthermore,
individuals excluded from a job should be compensated for the loss incurred
so that they do not bear the entire cost of fetal safety. 27
123. International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. 1196, 1196 (1991).
124. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1991).
125. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1260. Most judges currently tend to hold stereotypical
views of women. Id at 1261.
126. One scholar suggested that employees be allowed to transfer out of a hazardous job to an
available job upon their request, although this does not require the employer to maintain the
employee's former wage rate, nor to create additional jobs to accommodate the change. This
allows an employee to "control his or her toxic exposure level by attempting to ensure some
degree of job flexibility in light of personal reproductive plans." Hamlet, supra note 1, at 1147.
127. Employers, as an argument for fetal protection policies, state that they should not be the
one to bear the cost of fetal safety. This begs the question of why all female employees, many of
whom do not intend to and will not have children, should bear the full cost.
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The Johnson Controls decision does leave several issues open. The first
is the scope of the BFOQ. While the majority opinion narrowly construed
the BFOQ defense to allow policies only where they relate to the employee's
actual ability to perform the job, the concurring opinions expanded the
BFOQ to include considerations of cost and safety. A decision on the scope
of the BFOQ was unnecessary in Johnson Controls because Johnson Con-
trols' policy was not justified even under the broad BFOQ defense advo-
cated by the concurring justices. The majority correctly narrowed the
scope of the BFOQ. To include considerations of cost and safety would
confuse the BFOQ, which is a defense to overt discrimination, with the
business necessity defense, which justifies neutral policies having a discrimi-
natory effect.
The effect of Title VII on employer's potential tort liability towards chil-
dren of employees also remains unanswered. Should OSHA standards be
too lenient, compliance with Title VII and OSHA may still result in injuries
to children of employees, and thus lend to potential liability under state tort
law. While the majority of the justices were willing to assume that compli-
ance with Title VII would prevent any state tort liability, Justices White,
Rehnquist, and Kennedy strongly felt otherwise. Justice Scalia was correct
in stating that preemption occurs only when compliance with Title VII re-
quires a violation of state tort law.1 28 Furthermore, as indicated by the
White opinion, warnings to employees of potential hazards will not pre-
clude claims by injured children because parents cannot waive causes of
action on behalf of their children. 1 29 Nevertheless, because tort liability still
remains a possibility despite the prohibition of sex-specific fetal protection
policies, the fear of liability provides an incentive for employers to make the
work place safe for all employees.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court in International Union, UAW v. Johnson Controls30
clarified the proper guidelines for lower courts to follow when judging fetal
protection programs. The Court recognized that sex-specific fetal protec-
tion policies are overtly discriminatory and are generally unjustified as a
BFOQ. This interpretation of the 1964 Civil Rights Act comports with
established Title VIIV3  law and allows for a balancing of the interests of the
employers and society in fetal safety with those of the employees in equal
128. Johnson Controls, 111 S. Ct. at 1216 (Scalia, J., concurring).
129. Id. at 1211 (White, J., concurring).
130. 111 S. Ct. 1196 (1991).
131. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1991).
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employment opportunities. Any changes in this law should be made by
Congress. The precise scope of the BFOQ defense and the preemptive effect
of Title VII towards state tort liability still remain in issue. However, John-
son Controls clarified Title VII law with respect to fetal protection policies
by indicating that the BFOQ defense, and not the business necessity de-
fense, applies to sex-specific policies. Furthermore, given this decision, the
fear of tort liability will provide an incentive to make the work place safe
for all employees.
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